Does Mixed-Ownership Reform Catalyzes High-Quality Enterprise Development? Evidence from China

Ruonan Fang; Jingxia Yu

doi:10.63944/60f.JFEMR

Authors

Ruonan Fang School of Accounting and Auditing, Guangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanning, China Author
Jingxia Yu School of Accounting and Auditing, Guangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanning, China Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.63944/60f.JFEMR

Keywords:

Mixed-ownership reform; High-Quality Enterprise Development; Firm performance; State-owned enterprise

Abstract

The high-quality development of a nation's economy fundamentally relies on the high-quality development of every micro-enterprise. As a critical institutional innovation in China's economic system, clarifying the relationship between mixed-ownership reform and corporate high-quality development is essential. This study empirically examines the impact of
mixed-ownership reform on enterprise high-quality development using 2013–2023 Chinese A-share listed companies as the sample. Research findings demonstrate that mixed-ownership reform promotes enterprise high-quality development, while ownership concentration exerts an inhibitory effect. Further analysis reveals that the marginal benefits of mixed-ownership reform on enterprise high-quality development are stronger in private-owned enterprises; Mixed-ownership reform improves corporate performance by inhibiting corporate financialization. These discoveries provide valuable insights for deepening the understanding of mixed-ownership reform.

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